NURS FPX 4035 Assessment 2 Root-Cause Analysis and Safety Improvement Plan
Student Name
School of Nursing and Health Sciences, Capella University
NURS4035: Improving Quality of Care and Patient Safety
Instructor Name
Submission Date
Understanding What Happened | |
1. What happened?: Start by getting familiar with the flow of events that led to the occurrence of the sentinel event. Collect as much information as possible regarding the incident, such as time, persons involved, and circumstances. o What was the impact of the problem/event, and who was involved? | Mr. James Carter, a 68-year-old male patient who was in the intensive care unit recovering following cardiac surgery, suffered a sentinel event in which an episode of ventricular tachycardia (VT) was missed. The nurse who was given his care did not hear the alarm, which was critical on his cardiac monitor, as she had become numb to a barrage of non-urgent alarms. This negligence led to a late discovery of his emergency, leading to cardiac arrest, brain hypoxia, and permanent neurological impairment. This case showed that the ICU had major weaknesses with regard to responding to alarms. |
2. Why did it happen?: o Human Factors: Determine whether there was a communication breakdown, training or lack of training, or staff fatigue. o System Factors: Determine whether there was a communication breakdown, training or lack of training, or staff fatigue. o Organizational Culture: Determine whether it has cultural problems, a safety culture deficit, or a lack of leadership. o Society/Culture: How can cultural assumptions/ backgrounds play out? | A blend of organizational, human, and system factors could be attributed to the event. At the human level, the nurse was flooded with low-priority alarms, thus leading to the so-called alarm fatigue and an attenuation of the response (Salameh et al., 2024). In terms of systems, the alarm system lacked the option to place a priority on alert levels and, hence, critical warnings were not distinguished from the common ones. The organizational domains were associated with a deficit of leadership concern on the safety of alarms, the application of a reactive instead of a proactive approach on safety, and the absence of formal training on how to handle alarms. In addition, the ICU environment, with high levels of pressure, had acclimatized the frequent sounding of alarms, also weakening the staff’s responsiveness. Finally, habits at the workplace that embraced the use of frequent alarms as a way of life continued to encourage the behavior of desensitization. |
3. Did the protocols or standards become deviated?: o Procedures and Policies: Find out whether the procedures and policies were adhered to or there were deviations. o Did anything not happen, or did you not take any steps that you intended? o Documentation: Read medical records, nursing notes, and any other documentation. | The standards and protocols of alarm management in the clinic were definitely violated. There were alarms on, but they were not particular to the issue with which Mr. Carter was concerned, and to which the check was not done with the requisite urgency. There was a lack of clarity in terms of policies on alarm setting and response procedures and adherence to best practices regarding ranking and escalation of alarms (Dee et al., 2022). Previous alarm patterns, settings, or response times did not necessarily reflect in patient records and presented a hindrance to alarm fatigue detection or prevention. The malpractices are signs of the failure of the entire system and not of individual employees. |
4. Who was involved?: o Staff: Who and what are the roles of people in the event? o Supervisors and Managers: Investigate | The nurse should be directly responsible, and it should be his or her primary duty to monitor alarms of Mr. Carter. Nevertheless, the ICU supervisor and unit manager are equally culpable since not only did they not check on compliance with the guidelines of alarm response, but they also did not take a step in making sure that the staff was complying. Leadership failed to support and train against the occurrence of such incidents with the policy (Dee et al., 2022). Moreover, it lacked a mechanism for escalating missed critical alarms as well as scrutinizing staff alarm-response trends. |
5. Was there a breakdown in communication?: o Interdisciplinary Communication: Evaluate the effectiveness of various groups of people in communication. o Patient-Provider Communication: Explore whether patients were informed and understood their care. | Find out whether patients were informed and knew about their treatmentThe work of interdisciplinary teams was characterized by the poor quality of communication and the lack of a formal system based on it, like Situation, Background, Assessment, or Recommendation (SBAR), which would allow reporting abnormal cardiac rhythms in time (Irawati et al., 2025). There was also a deficiency in provider-patient communication; Mr. Carter and his family were not educated on how the alarm system works and why it is necessary, and this would have given them the confidence to contribute to alerting the staff members of a change. Having no sharing mediums of communication, an important gap was closed, and the situation had gone on as far without anybody noticing. |
6. What were its contributory factors?: o Physical Environment: Think of facility layout, availability of equipment, and workspaces. o Staffing Levels: Determine whether there was enough staffing or not. 7. Training and Competency: Evaluate the knowledge and skills of the staff. | Not many causal factors were found; the first one was the physical environment. There were numerous alarms of different monitoring systems, which made the soundscape of the ICU saturated with sounds, chaotic, and overwhelming. There was also a low level of staffing where one unit that dealt with high-acuity cases had only one nurse and was more likely to become desensitized and make errors in responding to alarms. The caregivers also experienced burnout further due to such pressure of work, which reduced their capacity to differentiate important and non-important alarms. Inadequacy of proper training and competence in handling the alarms was one of the problems of utmost concern. It had not been trained on recent approaches to alarm identification, priority, and response, and team members did not engage in simulation drills in case of real alarm scenarios (Dee et al., 2022). The staff was not prepared to deal with complex alarm systems because, with no periodic skill assessment and unceasing education, they were likely to be exhausted and make poor decisions. |
8. Was there any involvement of the organizational policies or procedures: o Policy Compliance: Inquire about whether there was adherence to policies. o Policy Clarity: Determine whether or not policies are explicit and available. | Policies that were instituted by the institutions also played a major role in this development. The hospital did not have clear and enforceable policies to define the trigger levels, priorities of alarms, or how the process of alarm escalation should be done (Dee et al., 2022). There was poor dissemination or inconsistency of the existing policies. Also, they did not have a regular policy review to keep abreast of any changes currently taking place in technology or the needs of the patients. This weak link in the leadership in the areas of monitoring and adhering to policies provided a lax environment in which safety measures were ignored or overlooked. |
9. Did it fail in any of the monitoring or surveillance?: o Vital Signs Monitoring: Determine whether or not any signs were missed. o Alarm Fatigue: Investigate whether or not alarms were disregarded. | The lack of awareness was a critical failure, although there were surveillance systems. Alarm fatigue resulted in the failure to respond to the alarm (though this alarm was activated). The deficiency of personalized alarm configurations and the inability to have systems that would detect whether or not the alarms were recognized and responded to led to the failure. No system was also established to audit the response time of alarms or even investigate unresponded alarms (Woo and Bacon, 2020). Such a lapse in monitoring was not only resulting in a delay in much-needed intervention, but also subjecting the patient to avoidable injury. |
10. What could be learnt in order to avoid recurrence?: o Lessons Learned: Find systemic changes, training requirements, and areas of improvement. o Quality Improvement: Have you thought of taking preventive actions? | This sentinel event throws light on the urgent need for a system change to the approach to alarm management. Instead of blaming workers for the problem of alarm fatigue, it can be considered a failure in design. Organizational leaders ought to endeavor to build a safety culture that looks into an active future by maximizing alarm settings, maintaining a sense of clarity in the procedures, and providing continuous and competency-affirmative education. The need to employ interdisciplinary frameworks, such as SBAR, and the adoption of an active attitude towards the normalization of deviance is also important. The quality initiatives are supposed to concentrate on a holistic solution that incorporates the utilization of tiered (e.g., colour-coded) notifications, customized settings (depending on a patient), and automated activation of unanswered notifications (Gani et al., 2025). The integration of the smart alarm system utilization with the electronic health record (EHR) platform can be used to improve the specificity of alarms, along with lessening the number of false alarms. |
11. What can be done to improve the safety of patients: o Risk Mitigation: work out strategies to reduce risks. o Education and Training : Make sure that the staff is trained. 12. Reporting and Feedback: Have an open reporting and learning from mistakes. | To enhance patient safety, the solution will be holistic, which will address risk mitigation, system design, and the expertise of the workforce. The alarm settings are to be adapted and tailored to each patient’s situation, and the high-priority alerts are to be clearly defined with a clear-cut process of escalation. Correlating alarms with real-time clinical information will ensure that they alert to real-time meaningful changes in patient conditions. The physical environment would be supportive of effective and clear warnings through the proper positioning of the monitors and keeping the background noise to a minimum. Problems with nurse-patient ratios should be fixed to provide prompt responses to determined alarms and to eliminate cognitive burnout (Rossum et al., 2023). The training should be continuous so that it comprises the recognition of alarms and how to react to them, alarm fatigue, and technical problems escalation to the biomedical teams. Another culture that needs to be adopted as far as continuing safety is concerned is a culture of non-punitive reporting. Without any fear, healthcare professionals should be free to report any mistakes related to alarm and near-miss cases. Each report should be seen by leadership as a learning experience for the organization, and shared lessons should be delivered via feedback channels, including safety briefings and performance dashboards. Open and transparent communications during shift changes and during team meetings help to ensure the detection of risks early, foster trust, and promote ongoing safety improvement. |
Etiology/Cause(s) of the problem or sentinel event?
When the above analysis is completed, please clearly indicate one or more root cause(s) that contributed to the problem or sentinel event. Based on the above factors, and depending on which root causes are valid, please select all the causes and place them in the column below.
Root Cause– the simplest cause of why the situation had to happen | Contributing Factors – other reason(s) why it was clear that a situation was not ideal. | HFC | HF T | HF F/S | E | R | B | |
Too many unactionable alarms resulting in alarm fatigue. Poor policies and enforcement of alarm management False/non-critical alarm high frequency | 1 | Lack of prioritization and management skills on the alarm. | ü | ü | ü | |||
2 | Untrained; incompleteness of regular competency tests/files | ü | ü | |||||
3 | Obsolete/imprecise protocols; lack of audit, feedback loops and updates on policies. | ü | ü |
HF-C = Human Factor-communication HF-T = Human Factor-training HF-F/S = Human Factor-fatigue/scheduling
E= environment/equipment R= rules/policies/procedures B=barriers
Use of Evidence-Based Strategies
Find proven best practice interventions that can help in solving the safety problem or sentinel event.
Alarm fatigue is due to too many alarms that are unnecessary, poor-fitting default thresholds, and a lack of support for clinical decision-making. Li et al. (2023) report that intelligent management can reduce the number and time of genuine and spurious alerts in a densely-alarmed environment, using intelligent alarm systems to reduce the number of alerts. This is not only beneficial in reducing the response time of the nurses to critical alarms, but also in avoiding fatigue due to alarming. According to Dee et al. (2022), a combination of evidence-based strategies is effective in implementing alarm management: educating staff, having clear policies and procedures, and reducing unnecessary patient monitoring. Last but not least, Fujita and Choi (2020) recommended having specific alarm parameter settings since factory settings of one size fits all create noise that becomes desensitizing to employees. |
Discuss the applicability of the strategies to the safety issues or sentinel event(s) that you have identified.
In the case of Mr. Carter, a smart alarm could have been implemented to weed out repetitive, clinically unimportant alerts, like transient heart-rate deviation, and saved a special, emergency alert because the nurse could have focused on a life-threatening rhythm. At the same time, a personalized parameter protocol would have set the VT threshold of Mr. Carter to 130 bpm (instead of the default) and have daily interdisciplinary reviews to change limits as Mr. Carter continued to progress in his postoperative condition; this would have dramatically decreased the number of non-actionable alarms and kept the clinical information relevant. Staff education (as recommended by Nyarko et al. 2023) would have instilled in the nurse confidence and muscle memory in discriminating between quick alarms in a busy ICU setting. In addition, planning and deploying explicit institutional policies and alarm response guidelines generate a predictable and responsive method for handling alarms (Dee et al., 2022). A systematic plan of raising unresponded critical alarms would have served as a safety net so that despite the poor nurse being temporarily overwhelmed, the onset of the VT episode by Mr. Carter would have led to a timely secondary action. |
Safety Improvement Plan
Write down any actions you will have to take in the future to avoid the same.
Action Plan There is one each of the above Root Cause/Contributing Factor(s) | E / C / A Choose one | |
1 | Do away with non-intelligent alarm hardware by having old monitors substituted with smart alarm systems | E |
2 | Control by training all the nurses of the ICU on comprehensive alarm response | C |
3 | Control by revising alarm-management policies to insist on setting the threshold individually. | C |
E = remove (i.e., piece of equipment is removed, fixed, or replaced.)
C = control (i.e., a step/warning is added or staff has been/re-educated)
A = accept (i.e., formal or informal conversations about: don’t let it happen again or pay better attention, but nothing will be done to change, and risk is taken)
Outline any new process or policy and/or professional development that is going to be taken to resolve the root cause(s).
The hospital will also have new procedures and education geared towards alarm safety to reverse future alarm-related sentinel events and improve the response of staff to the alarm. Firstly, the ICU will proceed to install outdated monitors with intelligent alarms that will introduce real-time trend analysis and machine learning filters to avoid the generation of non-actionable alarms and alert the staff only in case of clinically significant changes (Li et al., 2023). Then, ICU nurses would be offered quarterly training during which they would be provided with practical activities to enable them to recognize and manage different types of alarms. The focus of the sessions will be to inform the staff about how to distinguish between a real and a fake emergency or false or non-emergency alarms as quickly as they can. As an additional way of reinforcing the best practices, an alarm-management policy at the hospital will be amended to specify an individual alarm threshold when an ICU patient is admitted and during daily rounds (Dee et al., 2022). These policy modifications will be implemented through the obligatory in-service trainings and included in the yearly competency reviews, to ensure that alarm calibration and escalation practices will become second nature for each member of the team. |
Give the objectives or desired results of the activities outlined above, and a general plan of how the plan will be developed and implemented.
These measures will aim at minimizing aspects of alarm fatigue, enhancing response time among the nurses, and avoiding damage caused by a lack of alarms. In six months post-launch, false-alarm volume should decrease by 60 percent on the cardiac ICU beds measured through daily alarm-log reports, when the smart monitors are being utilized. In month three, the training and education curriculum and policy adjustments will be piloted using a small group of nurses; it will be rolled out, and biannual refreshers will be introduced by month twelve, hoping to decrease by at least 40% the critical-alarm response times (Dee et al., 2022). At the same time, compliance audits will ensure that 90 percent of patient monitors have programs with programmed thresholds. Progress will be monitored and debriefed quarterly to ensure there are no impediments, and fine-tuning of the policy can be done fast, so that in a year, all of these will ensure the avoidance of incidents such as the missed VT alarm in the case of Mr. Carter. |
Existing Organizational Resources
Determine resources that might have to be acquired to make the safety improvement plan successful. Reflect on what can be used using the available resources to improve the improvement plan.
Already, the hospital has a number of high-impact resources that it can use to accelerate and enhance alarm-safety plans. To start with, the clinical education department, which has experience in training and developing new programs, can easily adapt the new quarterly alarm drills in the current curriculum and prompt the staff to participate without necessarily bringing in outside consultants. A close collaboration with biomedical engineering and information technology (IT) services will assist in quickly implementing and rolling out smart alarm software on the monitors since they already support device hardware and integrating EHRs (Javaid et al., 2024). The quality improvement office actively controls indicators such as the number of alarms and response time, and the use of dashboards and audit processes can monitor the change in false alarms in real-time and the implementation of policy. The individualized threshold protocols will be able to be advanced through nursing leadership and individual influencers by involving peers within the units. Finally, the lessons learned regarding Mr. Carter’s sentinel event can be incorporated into the rewritten policies by the risk management and patient safety office, and help in the establishment of a just-culture environment that encourages constant reporting and constant improvement. Through these already existing departments, we can give the clinical education and the biomedical engineering/IT a priority since it has a direct influence on training and technology; thereby creating a strong, low-cost safety plan that is sustainable. |
References
Dee, S. A., Tucciarone, J., Plotkin, G., & Mallilo, C. (2022). Determining the impact of an alarm management program on alarm fatigue among ICU and telemetry RNs: An Evidence Based Research Project. SAGE Open Nursing, 8. https://doi.org/10.1177/23779608221098713
Fujita, L. Y., & Choi, S. Y. (2020). Customizing physiological alarms in the emergency department: A regression discontinuity quality improvement study. Journal of Emergency Nursing: JEN : Official Publication of the Emergency Department Nurses Association, 46(2), 188-198. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jen.2019.10.017
Gani, I., Litchfield, I., Shukla, D., Delanerolle, G., Cockburn, N., & Pathmanathan, A. (2025). Understanding “alert fatigue” in primary care: Qualitative systematic review of general practitioners attitudes and experiences of clinical alerts, prompts, and reminders. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 27(1). https://doi.org/10.2196/62763
Irawati, R., Widodo, A., & Yulian, V. (2025). The effective communication using SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment, Recommendation) of patient handover in inpatient installation. Journal Berita Ilmu Keperawatan, 18(1), 47–55. https://doi.org/10.23917/bik.v18i1.6967
Javaid, M., Haleem, A., & Singh, R. P. (2024). Health informatics to enhance the healthcare industry’s culture: An extensive analysis of its features, contributions, applications and limitations. Informatics and Health, 1(2), 123–148. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoh.2024.05.001
Li, B., Yue, L., Nie, H., Cao, Z., Chai, X., Peng, B., Zhang, T., & Huang, W. (2023). The effect of intelligent management interventions in intensive care units to reduce false alarms: An integrative review. International Journal of Nursing Sciences, 11(1), 133–142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijnss.2023.12.008
Nyarko, B. A., Nie, H., Yin, Z., Chai, X., & Yue, L. (2023). The effect of educational interventions in managing nurses’ alarm fatigue: An integrative review. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 32(13–14), 2985–2997. https://doi.org/10.1111/jocn.16479
Rossum, M. C. van, Bekhuis, R. E. M., Wang, Y., Hegeman, J. H., Folbert, E. C., Hutten, M. M. R. V., Kalkman, C. J., Kouwenhoven, E. A., & Hermens, H. J. (2023). Early warning scores to support continuous wireless vital sign monitoring for complication prediction in patients on surgical wards: Retrospective observational study. Journal of Medical Internet Research Perioperative Medicine, 6(1). https://doi.org/10.2196/44483
Salameh, B., Abdallah, J., Alkubati, S. A., & ALBashtawy, M. (2024). Alarm fatigue and perceived stress among critical care nurses in the intensive care units: Palestinian perspectives. BioMed Central Nursing, 23, 261. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12912-024-01897-x
Woo, M., & Bacon, O. (2020). Alarm fatigue. In Making Healthcare Safer III: A Critical Analysis of Existing and Emerging Patient Safety Practices [Internet]. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (US). https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK555522/
